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THE  STRUGGLE of the command economies to rediscover the market 
brings  to mind the Hungarian  joke: "Question: What is communism? 
Answer:  the longest road  from capitalism  to capitalism."  Having spent 
up to seven decades systematically attempting to eradicate market 
forces, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe  have reversed field in an attempt  to revive "the market." The 
effort  reveals much  about  both systems. 
My  paper  is divided  into three  general  areas. I begin  with  an overview 
of the aggregate  performance  in the socialist countries, particularly  the 
Soviet Union, and compare their performance  with that of Western 
countries.  Next I discuss the goals and  roadblocks  on the road  to reform, 
reform  plans  for the Soviet Union, and  the macroeconomic  issues facing 
socialist countries. I conclude with an assessment of the prospects for 
reform  in the Soviet Union. 
Background:  Stagnation and Disillusionment 
After decades of rapid growth in output and living standards, the 
socialist  countries  began  a marked  slowdown  in  economic  growth  around 
1970.  Table  1  shows  Angus  Maddison's  estimates  of the growth  in output 
and in output  per capita in the United States and in the Soviet Union 
over this century.  Soviet growth  has been respectable,  but was particu- 
larly so in the early stages. Table 2 presents estimates, using data 
prepared  by the U.S.  Central Intelligence Agency, on total factor 
productivity  in  the Soviet Union since 1961.  The data  suggest  that  output 
growth in the Soviet Union has derived primarily  from forced-draft 
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Table 1.  Average Annual Growth of Output and Productivity, Soviet Union 
and United States, 1900-87,  Various Periods 
Percent 
Gross domestic  product  GDP per capita 
Period  United  States  Soviet Union  United  States  Soviet Union 
1900-13  4.0  3.5  1.9  1.5 
1913-50  2.8  2.7  1.2  2.3 
1950-73  3.7  5.0  1.4  3.6 
1973-87  2.5  2.1  1.0  1.2 
1900-87  3.2  3.3  1.8  2.3 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on Maddison (1989, pp.  113, 128). 
Table 2.  Average Annual Growth of Output, Inputs, and Productivity, Soviet Union, 
1961-85,  Various Periods 
Percent 
Gr-oss  Ipt 
national  Total  factor  Inputs 
Period  product  productivity  Capital  Labor 
1961-70  5.0  0.6  8.1  1.8 
1971-80  2.7  -  1.3  7.5  1.5 
1981-85  1.9  -  1.0  6.2  0.7 
Source:  Kurtzweg  (1987, pp.  126-55). 
increases in inputs; total factor productivity  has shown only modest 
growth  or, in recent years, a decline. 
Why did growth slow so dramatically?  Analysts suggest numerous 
causes: a decrease in the growth of  inputs (depletion of  low-cost 
resources such as oil, aging of the capital stock, and deterioration  of 
labor  discipline);  lowered technological  change  and efficiency (because 
of numerous planning  errors and diversion of R&D activities to the 
military); exogenous economic shocks (poor weather and declining 
prices of exported  raw materials);  and greater  complexity of economic 
activity (with  more  products  and  greater  technical  complexity).  1 
Numerous  analysts, including  some Soviet economists, suggest that 
despite  efforts  to correct  misleading  Soviet statistics, Western  estimates 
have overstated  Soviet economic growth.  Many  indications  of poor and 
even deteriorating  quality in Soviet industries (both in terms of the 
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products  themselves and in the quality  of service) suggest  that exagger- 
ated  claims  of quality  improvement  bias  Soviet  price  statistics  downward 
and  lead to overstated  output  and  hence target  attainment.2 
The declining  growth  in Soviet output  is reinforced  by the low share 
of consumption  in GNP and  a rising  defense and  investment  burden.  The 
CIA estimates  that defense and investment  currently  absorb  around  40 
percent  of Soviet GNP, up from  roughly  34  percent  in 1960.  By contrast, 
investment  and defense absorb some 25 percent of GNP in the United 
States. The low Soviet consumption  share implies that the per capita 
GNP figures  overstate  the level of economic welfare  of the population. 
In this area, as in assessments of military  power, much  confusion  has 
been  generated  by Western  estimates  that  inflate  the quality  and  quantity 
of Soviet production.  According  to CIA estimates, the per capita  output 
of the Soviet Union is equal to that of Spain and well above that of 
Greece. Alternative  estimates of per capita output, as calculated by 
different  agencies and by using different measurement  concepts, are 
shown in table 3. Even the relatively  low estimates  by the International 
Comparisons  Project (ICP) may give too optimistic an impression of 
living standards.  It would be necessary to make further  corrections- 
adjusting  for the large share of output devoted to nonconsumption 
purposes in defense and investment, for the low quality and lack of 
availability  of goods, and for the frightening  deterioration  of environ- 
mental  quality  and public health-to  obtain an accurate  assessment of 
living  standards  in socialist countries. 
Yet another  way to measure  living  standards-calculating  incomes at 
black  market  exchange  rates-gives  a Soviet  per  capita  income  of roughly 
$225,  surely  a lower  bound  on  real  incomes.  With  an  overvalued  exchange 
rate  and  exchange  controls,  the  black  market  rate  reflects  the incremental 
value  of imported  goods, services, or safe foreign  assets to the desperate 
buyer;  it  will  therefore  place  an  extremely  high  value  on foreign  currency. 
In addition,  this rate  will tend to underestimate  real incomes because of 
the omission  of nontradable  goods. Still, while understating  per capita 
income,  this  figure  shows dramatically  the uncertainty  about  the level of 
2. The  upward  bias in the Soviet growth  rate  is described  in Aganbegyan  (1988,  p. 2). 
By contrast,  as Martin  Baily and Robert  Gordon  showed recently  in this  journal, there 
may be significant  quality understatement  in U.S.  national account statistics and a 
consequent  understatement  of real  economic  growth.  See Baily  and  Gordon  (1988). 290  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table 3.  Alternative Estimates of Per Capita GNP, Various Countries, 1987 
U.S. dollars 
Measured  by purchasing- 
power  parity 
International  Central  Measured  by 
Comparison  Intelligence  exchange  rates 
Country  Project  Agency  Official  Market 
United  States  18,550  n.a.a  b  18,530 
West Germany  13,680  n.a.a  b  14,400 
United  Kingdom  12,250  n.a.a  b  10,420 
Spain  8,520  n.a.a  b  6,010 
Greece  6,580  n.a.a  ...  4,020 
Soviet  Uniona  6,930  8,380  4,800  225 
Hungary  5,780  7,910  2,240  n.a. 
Poland  4,540  6,930  1,930  n.a. 
East Germany  9,660  11,300  n.a.  n.a. 
Sources:  Numbers  in the first column  are estimates  of purchasing-power  parity (PPP) levels  of  per capita GNP 
based  upon  the International  Comparison Project  (ICP) estimates.  For countries  other than the Soviet  Union  and 
East Germany,  the source is World Bank (1989, table 30, p. 233). For the Soviet  Union and East Germany, estimates 
are rough projections  from Summers and Heston  (1988).  Data on  1985 PPP relatives  are applied to  1987 U.S.  per 
capita  GNP.  Numbers  in the  second  column  are  from  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (1988).  Numbers  in the  third 
column  are from World Bank (1989,  table  1, p.  165) except  for the  Soviet  Union,  which  applies  official  exchange 
rate for commercial  transactions  to CIA estimates  of ruble-value  GNP.  Numbers  from the fourth column  are from 
World Bank (1989, table  1), except  for the Soviet  Union,  which applies  current black market rate of  13.5 rubles to 
the dollar. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  CIA does  not provide independent estimates  for these  countries. 
b.  These  currencies  are convertible  at market rates and do not have  separate official rates. 
Soviet real income and the extent to which common estimates may 
overstate  real  incomes in socialist countries. 
Perhaps  the most striking  comparison  is the performance  of East and 
West Germany.  At the end of World War II, the two Germanys  had 
roughly equal levels of productivity  and similar  industrial  structures.3 
After four decades of capitalism  in the West and socialism in the East, 
productivity  in East Germany  had fallen to a level estimated  between 
one-third and one-half of that in West Germany. Yet CIA estimates 
produce  the absurd  conclusion  that  the per capita  GNP of East Germany 
is more than 80 percent  that of West Germany  as estimated  by the ICP 
(see table 3). 
Of course, individuals  living in socialist countries  are unlikely  to be 
persuaded  by even the finest  Divisia indexes. The simple  unavailability 
of  many goods is  sufficient to convince consumers of the relative 
3.  For a discussion  of income  levels and performance  in different  parts  of Germany, 
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attractiveness  of the different systems.  This point was forcefully put in 
the comment of the flamboyant president of the Russian republic, Boris 
Yeltsin, on his voyage to America: 
There  were . ..  shattering  experiences  of another  sort-the  supermarkets,  for 
example.  When  I saw those shelves crammed  with  hundreds,  thousands  of cans, 
cartons, and goods of every possible sort, for the first time I felt quite frankly 
sick  with  despair  for the Soviet people. That  such  a potentially  superrich  country 
as ours  has been brought  to a state of such poverty  !4 
The Reform Agenda in Socialist Countries 
Virtually  all reform movements  in the  Soviet  Union  and Eastern 
Europe  have  endorsed  a  market  economy  as  the  ultimate  goal  of 
economic  reforms.  The  "Abalkin  report,"  the  most  comprehensive 
published analysis of the plans of Soviet economic  reformers, states: 
The main features of the model of a new economic  system  [are] .  .  . the use of 
the market  as the main  form  of coordinating  the activities of the participants  in 
production.  We have become convinced  on the basis of our  own experience  that 
there is no worthy alternative to the market mechanism as the method of 
coordinating  the activities  and  interests  of the economic subjects.5 
Actual  reform  plans,  however,  reveal  a  less  than  whole-hearted 
adoption of a market economy.  In already-reformed countries like Poland 
or Hungary, the vast bulk of economic  activity is still produced in state- 
owned firms, and housing prices are closer to zero than to market levels. 
Radical Reform explicitly advocates continued primary state ownership 
of energy, defense,  transportation, and communications;  an unspoken 
presumption is that the state will continue to own and operate normal 
government services,  education,  and health, and may control housing 
4. Yeltsin  (1990,  p. 255)  contains  a fascinating  and  almost  believable  autobiography. 
5.  Radical Reform (1989, pp. 2-4).  The Abalkin report, Radical Economic  Reform.- 
Top-Priority  and Long-Term Measures  (hereafter called Radical Reform), was presented 
by Leonid  Abalkin,  Deputy  Prime  Minister,  to the Organizing  Committee  of the All-Union 
Conference  and  Workshop  on the Problems  of Radical  Economic  Reform.  This proposal 
was  debated  at a meeting  of the Council  of Ministers  in November  1989  but  was ultimately 
rejected  in favor  of a more  conservative  approach.  Among  the chief drafters  of Radical 
Reform  were  Academician  Stanislav  Shatalin  (Secretary  of the Economics  Division  of the 
Soviet  Academy  of Sciences  and  recently  appointed  to Gorbachev's  cabinet)  and  Professor 
Yevgeniy  Yasin  (formerly  of TSEMI  and currently  director  of the U.S.S.R. Commission 
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prices for many years.6 A rough guess is that these sectors would 
comprise  only half of GNP in today's Soviet economy. 
In addition, popular discussion in the Soviet Union reveals both 
egregious  misconceptions  and  deep  reservations  about  the  consequences 
of living  in a market  economy. Hostility  toward  entrepreneurial  activity 
is profound,  and "speculation" is a four-letter  word. In her insightful 
"Letter from Europe," Jane Kramer writes, "The mystique of the 
market  has nothing  to do with a marketplace.  When  Russians  talk  about 
the market,  they are talking  about everything  from a new Communism 
to whatever government  of the left or right they happen to admire.'  '7 
Hearing an oxymoron like  "free-market  Communism" makes one 
suspect  that  the market  under  discussion  is closer to the Hegel of political 
theorists  than  to the haggle  of the Fulton  Fish Market. 
A final  puzzle concerns the scant attention  in the reform  debates to 
the implications  of a market  economy for the distribution  of income. 
Many Westerners  are offended  by the excesses of income, wealth, and 
power generated  by market  rewards. They wonder about a society in 
which newly minted lawyers get paid more than their professors, in 
which the rich paint their names on their  personal  airlines  or trade  ball 
players like baseball  cards, and in which a financier  pays a $600  million 
fine for the investment  banker's  equivalent  of a speeding  ticket and has 
plenty left over. It was just such excesses that led Arthur  Okun  to give, 
"Two cheers for the market,  but not three." 
The vanities of  capitalism, however, are the price of  a  market 
economy-where  wages and  prices reflect  how well products  sell rather 
than how much some elite thinks they are really worth. Prices and 
incomes in the market  are determined  by dollar votes in the market- 
place, not ballot  votes in elections or  bullet  votes at the barricades.  Have 
the socialist  reformers  absorbed  the reality  of the income  distribution  in 
markets  in their  doctrines? 
Roadblocks on the Route to the Market 
To reach  the  ultimate  goal  of a market  economy, the socialist  countries 
must overcome numerous obstacles that prevent the emergence of 
6.  RadicalReform  (1989, p. 25). 
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market  forces. For the Soviet Union, the hurdles  are daunting.  It is as 
if, having  spent  seven decades  pouring  herbicide  on every growing  thing 
in the backyard,  they suddenly  decide to cultivate  a garden.  Among  the 
chief difficulties  that  the Soviet Union faces are the following. 
PRICE  REFORM  AND  FREE-MARKET  PRICING.  Prices of both inputs 
and outputs are often far from market-determined  levels. Perhaps  the 
most  thorough  study  of relative  prices  in socialist  and  market  economies 
was made in the international  comparison study of incomes, which 
included  Poland  but  not the Soviet Union. The study  found  coffee selling 
in Poland  at 9.1 times the U. S. price, personal  automobiles  at 5.1 times 
the U. S. price. At the other  extreme, rent  was 45 percent  of U. S. rents 
for equivalent  dwellings, and dentist services were 7 percent of U. S. 
levels.8  Anecdotal  reports  today indicate  that  apartments  in major  cities 
rent for as little as 2 percent  to 3 percent  of income (perhaps  $1 or $2 a 
month). 
Sooner  or later, if prices are to be market-determined,  relative  prices 
must  be allowed  to move to the appropriate  levels. One of the important 
vehicles for introducing  realistic prices is to open the economy to 
international  trade. In addition, free markets would involve dramatic 
changes in the functioning  of capital and labor markets;  unprofitable 
firms  must be forced to close or allowed to lay off workers  or threaten 
unproductive  workers  with unemployment.9 
One measure  of the sparseness of markets  in the Soviet economy is 
the number  of prices. According  to Nikolay P. Shmelev, there are, in 
the  Soviet Union, 25  million  distinct  prices-upon reflection,  an  absurdly 
small  number  for a modern  economy. For example,  there  are  at any time 
in the United States some 25 million  trucking  tariffs,  as well as some 50 
million  airline  prices (some may wonder whether this is overdoing  it a 
bit).10  George Stigler  and James Kindahl  report  that one can get price 
quotations  on 135  million  varieties  of hot rolled  carbon  steel sheets."I  A 
rough  guess would  be that  the number  of products  on which one can get 
8. Author's  calculations  based  on Kravis,  Heston,  and  Summers  (1982,  appendix  table 
6.3). 
9. In  principle,  Soviet  firms  that  lay off workers  today  have the obligation  to find  them 
jobs. 
10. Shmelev  (1988,  p. 320). I am told that  this figure  comes from  counting  the number 
of distinct  products  for  which  prices  are  quoted.  This  example  was  developed  in  discussions 
with  Alfred  Kahn. 
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price quotations  at any time in the United States must be in the tens of 
billions. 
Although  somewhat artificial,  this price count reveals an important 
defect of a command  economy: the price system does not operate in 
many sectors of the economy. Because most capital assets are owned 
by the state, markets  for  land,  capital  goods, and  risk-bearing  are  virtually 
nonexistent. Socialist ideology has prevented  the development  of thick 
markets  in financial  capital  or in housing. Households have as sparse  a 
menu of financial assets  as  of foodstuffs. There is  relatively little 
differentiation  in labor  remuneration  for different  labor  skills. In short, 
Soviet prices are doing neither  the gross tuning  nor the fine tuning  that 
they do in an advanced  market  economy. 
HARD  BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS.  Sovietenterprisesoperatewith  "soft 
budget  constraints,"  a term  signifying  that  operating  losses lead to more 
bank credits rather than to bankruptcies.  In planned economies that 
have turned to price instead of quantity  rationing, such as Hungary, 
firms  engage  in endless haggling  with the central  authorities  about  taxes 
or credit  conditions.  12 Of course, the United States is no stranger  to the 
peril  of soft budget  constraints:  its taxpayers  will be paying  hundreds  of 
billions in extra taxes over the next few years because of the lack of 
budget  discipline  in the federal  deposit insurance  system. 
STABILIZATION.  Some of the socialist economies have growing 
problems  of large  budget  deficits and repressed  inflation.  Developing a 
full market economy will require achieving fiscal balance, a topic 
addressed  in the next section. It is likely that stabilization  will require 
budget reforms, such as  the substitution of  income-tested transfer 
payments  for heavily  subsidized  food and  housing  prices. Imposing  hard 
budget  constraints  on Soviet enterprises  will also involve reforming  the 
free granting  of credits  or subsidies  to unprofitable  enterprises. 
PRIVATIZATION  OF  INDIVIDUAL  SECTORS.  In the United  States 
and other market  economies, output is primarily  produced in private 
firms. Despite the alarums  about the growth  of the public sector in the 
United States, only 3 percent of U.S. GNP is produced  in the federal 
sector and 10 percent in all levels of government and government 
enterprises. In socialist countries, the analogous figure is probably 
between  80  percent  and  90  percent.  Even today, after  the market  reforms 
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introduced in Poland at the beginning of  1990, somewhere  around 80 
percent of Polish GNP is produced in government enterprises.13  At some 
point,  in a gradual or abrupt way,  the actual decisions  about buying, 
selling, pricing, producing, borrowing, and lending must be made on a 
decentralized basis by private agents. 
COMPETITION.  One underrated  element in economic reform is 
introducing  competition  into  markets.  Centrally  planned  economies 
have  pursued  Engels's  view  that  socialism  is  "one  giant  factory." 
Monopoly is pervasive.  This industrial structure must be replaced with 
one with workable competition-say,  three or more independent firms 
and exposure to international competition. 
INSTITUTIONS  OF  THE  MARKET.  Above all, the Soviet economy 
lacks the institutions  and infrastructure that are required to operate  a 
market economy.  These include accountants and accounting standards, 
lawyers and contract laws,  market research and sales people,  banking 
regulations and bankers, a list emphasizing that the written rules-the 
decrees  that  proliferate  in  socialist  economies-may  be  much  less 
important than the human capital embodied in experienced  people who 
understand and operate the institutions  of the market. Property rights 
must be completely redefined. 
In addition, people will have to adopt the attitudes of the market. As 
Professor Yevgeniy  Yasin puts it: 
The market  is a social institution  that requires  certain rules of conduct from 
people. "Economic  man"-with  his inherent  rational  conduct, strongly  moti- 
vated by considerations  of personal  profit,  calculating,  driven by the spirit  of 
enterprise, ready to take risks and assume personal responsibility for his 
actions-should be given  public  recognition. 
The  model  that  is currently  prevalent  in  the Soviet Union  is of "administrative 
man," to use H. Simon's term. He is typically used to submission  and giving 
orders,  to living  in a structure  of prevailing  vertical  links. In his subordinate  role, 
he is likely  to show  pro  forma  obedience,  turning  to actions  without  rules. Lower 
strata  of the hierarchy  expect the upper  strata  to protect  them  in most relations 
with  the outside  world  and  recognize  social paternalism  as the norm.  14 
Table 4 provides a summary list of the obstacles  on the road to a fully 
developed market economy.  The list is long,  and introducing any one 
13. Economic Report of the President,  February 1990, table C-8. For socialist  coun- 
tries, private  conversations.  We might  wonder  whether  the market-oriented  Poles have 
inadvertently  invented  a form  of market  socialism  quite  unlike  that  envisioned  by Oskar 
Lange  and  others. 
14. See Yasin  (1990,  p. 16),  with  slight  changes  in translation. 296  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table  4. Roadblocks  to Economic  Reform 
1. Price  reform  and free-market  pricing  6. Stabilization 
Eliminate  central  allocation  and  Reduce budget  deficit 
rationing  Raise interest  rates 
Raise prices on necessities  Anti-inflation  policies (tax-based 
Free competitive  sectors  incomes policies, foreign 
Privatize  and regulate  natural  competition) 
monopolies  7. Budget  reform 
2. International  Remove redistributional  pricing 
Remove quantitative  restrictions  and  and substitute  income-tested 
substitute  tariffs  transfers 
Align different  exchange rates  Remove subsidies  to failing  firms 
Allow foreign  investment  8. Decentralize  economic  decisions 
Convertibility  of currency  Allow private  property 
3. Capital  market  changes  Separate  firms  from government 
Free interest  rates  Privatize  firms  and production 
Commercial  (retail)  banking  separated  9. Competition 
from central  bank  Break  up monopolistic  state firms 
Control  money supply  Antitrust  laws and regulation 
4. Labor  markets  Entry of foreign  firms 
Free firms  to lay off workers  Encourage  small enterprises 
Unemployment  insurance  and welfare  10. Institutions  of the market 
reforms  Contract  and bankruptcy  law 
Housing  reforms  for mobility  Train  managers 
5. Hard budget  constraints  Nurture  homo economicus 
Reform  accounting  Change  anti-market  sentiments 
Profit  constraints 
Credit  constraints 
End tax and regulatory  haggling 
measure  will encounter  formidable  institutional  and political  obstacles. 
Moreover, a simple catalogue  does not capture  the interconnection  of 
the different obstacles. For example, hard budget constraints are a 
prerequisite  to allowing  realistic  cost calculations  for free-market  pric- 
ing, to bank reform, to reducing the government deficit, to reducing 
enterprise  subsidies in the budget  reform,  to efficient  private  decision- 
making,  and  to nurturing  homo economicus  and the spirit  of enterprise. 
Sequencing the Transition:  the Three  Approaches 
There  is little disagreement  among  reformers  about  the need to move 
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and  speed  of the transition.  Socialist  economies have so many  problems, 
and they are so interconnected, that reformers  are unsure where to 
begin. Should they start with the budget, with privatization, with 
property  reforms, with capital markets, with reducing  subsidies, with 
freeing  the ruble, or what? Should reform  begin with budget  reform  so 
as to prevent  a price-wage-price  spiral  when prices are decontrolled?  Or 
should  price  inflation  and  wage controls  be used to reduce  real  aggregate 
demand?  Should there be a first step to get prices close to the market 
before letting prices go? Or is it hopeless to try to guess the "right" 
market  price? Should  prices be decontrolled  now, so that incentives to 
production  are enhanced?  Or should  the monopolies  be broken  up first 
to prevent  the exercise of monopoly  power?  Should  governments  avoid 
political peril by postponing an increase in the prices of necessities 
(housing,  food, and energy)?  If so, will the resulting  queues and ineffi- 
ciencies restrict  labor  mobility,  impede  adjustments,  and  reduce incen- 
tives to work  and bear  risk?  This list could be multiplied  indefinitely. 
The reform  debate is currently  divided into three camps: the radical 
(sometimes  called  the "big  bang")  approach,  which  would  introduce  the 
market  reforms  simultaneously;  the step-by-step  approach,  which  would 
phase in reforms gradually; and the conservative approach, which 
advocates  moving  cautiously  if at all toward  a market. 
BIG BANG  APPROACH.  The  approach  currently  being  tested  in Poland 
is the simultaneous  introduction  of numerous  pro-market  measures.  The 
Polish  authorities  are  removing  barriers  to entry  and  exit in  most  markets, 
decontrolling  many  prices, liberalizing  foreign  trade,  reducing  subsidies, 
and stabilizing  the economy. The example most often pointed to as a 
historical  precedent  is the 1948  monetary  reform  in West Germany."5  It 
should be  emphasized, however, that virtually no privatization or 
demonopolization  has yet occurred in Poland, and some observers 
15. As a matter  of historical  accuracy,  however,  it should  be noted  that  there  are two 
big  differences  between  the German  reforms  of 1948  and  the current  situation  in socialist 
countries.  First,  although  Germany  had been subjected  to considerable  central  rationing 
and  price  controls,  which  began  in 1935,  many  of the institutions  of the market  remained 
in place-banks, large  private  corporations,  accounting  systems, and, most important, 
human  capital  in the market  skills and knowledge  of the functioning  of markets.  Second, 
the movement  to a full market  was phased  in over an extended  period,  with many  prices 
controlled  and  the  currency  partially  inconvertible  until  the 1950s.  This  episode  is described 
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believe that  this may be responsible  for part  of the steep price increases 
in early 1990. 
STAGED  APPROACH.  The approach  currently  favored  by economic 
reformers  in the Soviet Union  is the step-by-step  or gradual  introduction 
of economic reforms. The Abalkin  plan described in Radical Reform 
espouses this approach,  which envisages three stages over six to ten 
years. The first  stage is to create the legal framework  (law on property, 
law on bankruptcy,  and so forth)  in which markets  can grow. A second 
stage would take a number  of substantive  reforms (reduce the budget 
deficit,  reform  prices, close unprofitable  enterprises,  and  reform  credit). 
The  third  stage  would  allow  a significant  amount  of market  determination 
of prices and introduce  foreign competition  and partial  ruble converti- 
bility. 
CONSERVATIVE  APPROACH.  In late 1989, different  approaches  to 
reform  were debated  in the U.S.S.R. Council  of Ministers.  The Abalkin 
plan was criticized, and a substitute introduced by Prime Minister 
Nikolay Ryzhkov was adopted. The conservative plan had three ele- 
ments: stabilize the economy by balancing  the state budget, retighten 
central controls in wage and price determination,  and reallocate re- 
sources from defense and investment to consumer  goods.16 It is note- 
worthy that the most painful and politically sensitive step-price  re- 
form-has  been repeatedly  postponed during  perestroika.  The price of 
bread  is scheduled  to increase in July 1990,  and some other goods may 
see price  increases  in January  1991,  but a thorough  price  reform  is still a 
distant  goal. 
In the spring  of 1990,  after  Gorbachev  was elevated to his position as 
president with strong executive powers, there was a great deal of 
speculation  about whether he would use his powers to introduce  a big 
bang, or at least to move quickly  with the first  phase of the step-by-step 
reform  advocated  by his close advisers. While it is difficult  to read the 
tea leaves, it appears  that the big bang approach  has been rejected  and 
that  the first  steps of reform  will be introduced  in the summer  of 1990.  It 
seems likely that the steps will take the form of continued property 
reforms  and  liberalization  of the rules of enterprise. 
The most treacherous steps involve "price reform," which is the 
euphemism  for raising  consumer  prices. Given the perils  of speculative 
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hoarding,  it would clearly be foolish to announce  a major  price reform 
far in advance. On the other hand, imposing  reforms  without popular 
support  invites strikes,  dissension, and  loss of confidence  in the govern- 
ment. 
Reflections  on the Three Strategies 
In weighing  the relative attractiveness  of the three approaches,  the 
experience of economic reforms in other countries can usefully be 
applied.  17 To begin  with, it is clear  that  if by a big bang  we mean  moving 
immediately  to a genuine  market  economy, this is simply  impossible.  As 
table  4 shows, the steps necessary to create a genuine  market  economy 
require  a great  deal of fundamental  restructuring,  some of which (such 
as development of capital markets, education, fostering the spirit of 
enterprise,  and full privatization  of state enterprises)  will require  years 
or decades  to accomrplish. 
What  is usually meant  by a big bang is in fact a simultaneous  partial 
liberalization  (such as occurred  in Poland).  This would involve freeing 
prices in a substantial  part  of the economy (most of the tradable  sector 
along with small enterprises) while opening the economy to foreign 
trade.  Such  an  approach  would  seem  feasible  where  a country  is relatively 
small  and  open, where the public is hostile to a socialism  imposed  by a 
foreign  power, and where there is some experience or at least memory 
of markets.  These criteria  would  apply  in  most of the countries  of Eastern 
Europe,  particularly  Poland, East Germany,  Hungary,  and Czechoslo- 
vakia.  Obviously,  a big bang  could be used for isolated sectors within  a 
largely capitalist  economy (as in lifting government  regulation  of the 
airlines  in the United States or in privatizing  nationalized  enterprises  in 
Japan  and  the United  Kingdom). 
But is the big bang appropriate  for the Soviet Union? However 
appealing  this approach  is to frustrated  reformers,  I am skeptical  about 
its acceptability  or advisability  for the Soviet Union as of mid-  1990.  The 
Soviet  economy  is large,  closed, and  extremely  hierarchical.  The obsta- 
cles to reform  are higher  and deeper in the Soviet Union than in other 
Eastern  European  countries.  Unlike  other  socialist  countries,  the Soviet 
yen for the market  is primarily  confined  to mathematical  economists. 
17. Particularly  useful are the lessons from development  economics. A thoughtful 
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While  the system is barely  creaking  along  today, it could be worse. The 
short-term  gains from a big bang  are limited,  while the risks include  the 
possibility of a complete breakdown  of the economy, mass unemploy- 
ment, political unrest, widespread  economic distress, breakdowns  in 
the distribution  chain, hunger,  or famine. 
If the Soviet leaders  choose instead  a step-by-step  approach,  are  there 
any lessons about the best sequence for reforms?  With  one exception, 
the sequence envisioned  by the Abalkin  plan  discussed above seems on 
the whole a reasonable  plan. The Abalkin  plan begins by fostering  the 
institutions  of the market,  then moves on to stabilize  the economy and 
align relative prices, and finally  to free markets. My only reservation 
about  the plan  is that  it may  place too little emphasis  on macroeconomic 
stabilization  efforts needed to reduce the queues and prevent serious 
macroeconomic  imbalances.  This important  issue will be addressed  in 
greater  detail  in the next section. 
Although there are strong reasons for favoring the step-by-step 
approach  as the only realistic  path  for the Soviet Union, one important 
danger  must be acknowledged-that the transition  will be phased in so 
slowly as effectively to  stall reform. This is,  indeed, a reasonable 
description  of the progress  of the Gorbachev  reforms  through  May 1990; 
they have almost surely exacerbated the economic problems of the 
Soviet economy. It appears  that the liberalization  of the economy after 
1985  allowed firms  to raise wages above planned  levels with the result 
that  incomes  outran  production.  As the shortages  grew  more  severe, the 
government  recontrolled  prices  and  tightened  central  control;  the extent 
of rationing  is greater  now than  at any time since World  War  II. 
A defender  of the recontrol  might  cite Lenin's dictum  that progress 
requires two  steps forward and one step backward. Without great 
vigilance, this easily becomes two steps backward  for every one step 
forward-and thwarts  reform  altogether. 
These reflections  raise an intriguing  possibility, a Murphy's  Law of 
Reforms. This holds that reforming  an internally  consistent economic 
system makes  things  get worse before  they get better.  Any single  reform 
(or perhaps any limited set of pro-market  reforms)  will aggravate  the 
difficulties  of a command  economy. The reason is that socialist states 
have evolved a set of rules, incentives, and expectations designed to 
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economy. Changing  any rule, however sensible in the framework  of a 
market  economy, may lead to distortions  that worsen performance  in 
the partially  reformed  command  economy. 
In other words, within the framework  of the command economy, 
planners,  consumers,  and enterprises  adapt  their behavior  to optimize 
their  objectives.  For  a given  set of institutions,  planners  devise incentives 
that  lead  economic  agents  to perform  relatively  efficiently.  If the  planners 
are  competent,  they achieve a local optimum  subject  to the fundamental 
ideological  and  political  constraints  of socialism. Removing  one or two 
of the constraints  will defeat some of the rules that have produced  the 
local socialist  optimum. 
A biological  metaphor  that captures  the adaptive  nature  of economic 
systems comes to mind. No one doubts that a fish swims better than a 
dog. But dogs do swim in their own funny way. And replacing  a dog's 
legs with a fish  tail, in a step-by-step  reform  of canine  navigation,  would 
quickly  produce  one sad pup. 
Economic Stabilization 
A central task of managing  economic reform will be to maintain 
macroeconomic  stability  during  the transition.  On the whole, this is a 
new  topic  for socialist  reformers.  Until  recently,  socialist  macroeconom- 
ics referred  to economic planning  and ensuring  plan  fulfillment.  Unem- 
ployment  was nonexistent in principle  and, for the most part, in fact. 
Inflation  of official  prices was contained  by leaving official  prices fixed 
for long periods. When aggregate demand became excessive,  these 
economies  suffered  "repressed  inflation,"  a syndrome  in which  too-low 
prices  result  in high  black  market  prices, long lines for goods, and  forced 
saving.  What  Western  economists  call "macroeconomics,"  in the sense 
of the determinants  of national  income  and  output  in the short  run,  is not 
yet a discipline  among  Soviet economists. 
As socialist economies begin to liberalize their prices and allow 
enterprises  to fire  workers,  the familiar  symptoms  of a market  economy 
emerge.  People lose their  jobs, liberalized  prices (in both the state and 
private  sectors)  begin to rise, and the populace  complains  about  unem- 
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against  the need  for stabilization  policy as the nation  makes  the transition 
to the market.'8 
The task of short-run  macroeconomic  policy is to ensure that the 
economy is in overall or aggregate  balance. Using fiscal and monetary 
policies, policymakers aim for internal balance, which signifies that 
nominal  aggregate  demand  is close to the  potential  output  of the economy 
at the existing price level.'9 Internal  balance involves both a level (or 
stock) and a growth  (or flow)  requirement.  The level requirement  is that 
desired spending  in the economy (by households, enterprises,  and the 
government)  be close to the current-price  value of output;  the growth 
requirement  is that total incomes and total spending  grow at about the 
same  rate  as potential  output.  If desired  spending  in the economy greatly 
exceeds the current-price  value of potential  output, then the economy 
will tend toward  repressed  or open inflation. 
By these criteria, the Soviet economy currently  has many serious 
macroeconomic problems. To begin with, the government budget is 
seriously out of equilibrium,  resulting in flow imbalance. The budget 
deficit  has grown  from  2 percent  of GNP in the early 1980s  to around  11 
percent of  GNP in  1989. There is  also stock imbalance, with the 
government  debt at around  44 percent  of GNP and  growing.  In a market 
economy, such  a large  deficit  and  debt  could  be mopped  up  by borrowing; 
in the Soviet economy, however, the absence of marketable  securities 
means  that  the deficit  is effectively  monetized.  The  large  quasi-monetary 
imbalance  is sometimes  referred  to as a "ruble  overhang,  " which  denotes 
a large accumulation  of undesired  holdings of money and other liquid 
assets by households  and  enterprises. 
The easiest way to determine  the size of the ruble overhang is to 
calculate  the ratio  of household  liquid  assets to household  income. Based 
on fragmentary  data, this ratio is estimated  to have risen from around 
0.6 in the 1970s  (when there was little ruble  overhang)  to around  0.95 in 
1989.20 Applying  the crude quantity  theory suggests that prices would 
18. A discussion  of the issues from  a Soviet perspective  is contained  in Kagalovsky 
and Khandruyev  (1990).  The authors  are directors  of research  at, respectively,  the State 
Committee on Construction  and the State Bank of the Soviet Union. Many of the 
macroeconomic  issues are  addressed  in Ofer  (1990). 
19. Macroeconomic  balance  also  entails  external  balance,  in  which  the  current  account 
and  capital  flows are in balance.  I concentrate  on issues of internal  balance  as these seem 
more  pressing  for the Soviet Union  in the near  term. 
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have to rise more than 50 percent to extinguish  the overhang.21  Unless 
neutralized,  the ruble overhang  will produce a sharp, one-time rise in 
prices when  prices are decontrolled. 
An understandable  response to the peril  of a large  and growing  ruble 
overhang-indeed a policy  followed by the Soviet government  since late 
1989-is  to clamp down tighter  on prices. But that strategy works no 
better  than  tightening  the lid on an overheated  pot. It is not possible for 
centrally  planned  economies  to avoid  difficulties  from  excessive demand 
by controlling  prices. In an economy with price controls-whether the 
Soviet Union in 1990  or the United States in 1944-the  result  of excess 
demand  is shortages,  long lines, and an increasingly  inefficient  distribu- 
tion system. One  result  of the German  decontrol  of 1948  or of the Polish 
decontrol of 1990 is that goods magically appear in the shops. (The 
problem is that they are too expensive to buy.) The inefficiencies of 
repressed  inflation  are yet another  reason why it is imperative  for East 
European  economies  to get and  retain  control  of their  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies. 
Figure 1 illustrates  the impact of a growing ruble overhang. At an 
initial  equilibrium,  with aggregate  demand  of AD and aggregate  supply 
of AS, prices are fixed below market-clearing  levels. State firms are 
producing  at point a, and the excess of desired spending  over output  is 
given  by the segment  ac. The actual  outcome  depends  upon  the rationing 
mechanism,  but we can simplify  by assuming  that  goods are rationed  by 
queuing, that the length of the queue adjusts to balance supply and 
demand,  and  that  the goods obtained  by queuing  are  then  resold at black 
market  prices.22  Under these assumptions, point b in figure 1 is the 
"true" price as measured  either by the black market  prices or by the 
21. The  reasoning  based  on the  quantity  theory  runs  as follows. Assume  that  household 
liquid  assets (which  are primarily  currency  and savings accounts)  are the only "outside 
money." That is, they are the only nominally  denominated  exogenous variable  in the 
economy.  Further  suppose that the economy was in macroeconomic  equilibrium  with a 
asset-income  ratio  of 0.60 and that  the asset-income  ratio  rose to 0.95 today. Then, if the 
only factor  out of equilibrium  were the ruble  overhang,  prices would have to rise by a 
factor  of 0.95/0.60,  or slightly  over 50 percent, to reestablish  the earlier  desired asset- 
income  ratio. 
22. An illustration  of such a mechanism  is provided  in the paper  by David  Lipton  and 
Jeffrey  Sachs in this issue. Note that the assumption  concerning  queuing  will lead to a 
relatively  benign  outcome.  If some  of the  scarce  goods  are  siphoned  off  to the  nomenclatura 
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Figure  1. Impact  of Ruble  Overhang:  Increase  of Demand  from Deficit 
Price  level 
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AD  'b' 
Fixed  pr-ice  a  c  Cb 
National  output 
shadow prices of output including  costs of waiting, bribing,  and using 
influence. 
As the budget  deficit  increases  the ruble  overhang,  aggregate  demand 
rises to AD'. Because prices are fixed, there is of course no official 
inflation.  But the excess demand  gets worse as the amount  people wish 
to buy at the official  price  level increases  while the supply  is unchanged. 
The ex ante shortage-which  is the difference between aggregate  de- 
mand and supply at official prices-grows  to ac'.  The black market 
prices or shadow  prices rise to b'. 
What  is the result?  The shelves get barer  and barer;  lines get longer 
and longer; the stores have nothing to offer but rusty tins and rotten 
cauliflower;  the street  price of hard  currency  diverges  even further  from 
the official  rate;  the free prices in  farmers'  stalls  rise sharply;  consumers 
must spend more and more time foraging  for goods; consumers buy 
goods they don't need as a desperate  form of saving;  people from high- 
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regions,  exacerbating  regional  tensions;  those who have or sell goods at 
the high social shadow prices are vilified and accused of profiteering; 
economic planners  are driven to ration basic goods-like  soap, meat, 
and sugar-in  effect replacing  the devalued ruble with a multitude  of 
local and commodity-specific  currencies in the form of rationing  cou- 
pons. In essence, by an extension of Gresham's  law, overvalued  things 
(rubles)  are driving  out undervalued  things  (goods). 
It is clear  that, whatever  the pace of reforms,  the Soviet government 
must  restore  macroeconomic  balance. One approach  often discussed is 
to attack  the problem  by soaking  up the ruble  overhang.  Some call for a 
"monetary reform," which in effect confiscates some of the ruble 
overhang  by introducing  a new currency  at unfavorable  rates  to existing 
rubleholders.  Another  approach  is to introduce  a "parallel  currency," 
perhaps one convertible into hard currencies. Yet a third approach, 
similar  to that taken in Poland  at the beginning  of 1990,  would be to let 
prices  rise sharply  so that  the real  value of ruble  holdings  declines to the 
level desired  by ruble  owners. 
In fact, these ideas will at best solve the stock, or level, problem  and 
leave the flow, or growth, problem  of a large  budget  deficit  untouched. 
If the budget  deficit  continues  at high  levels, aggregate  demand  will grow 
rapidly,  and  the "inflationary  gap" between  desired  spending  at existing 
prices and real output will continue to widen, producing continued 
repressed  or open inflation.  A durable  solution to the macroeconomic 
problem  of excess demand  will require  a reduction  in the budget  deficit. 
This  point  leads  to an important  linkage  between macroeconomic  and 
structural  policies. Almost all observers  of the Soviet economy believe 
that  the structure  of the budget  is inefficient  and undesirable.  There  are 
substantial  subsidies  to food and  agriculture  (amounting  to 24 percent  of 
the Soviet  budget,  or 12  percent  of GNP) and  to unprofitable  enterprises 
(about  10  percent  of the budget,  or 5 percent  of GNP). Defense probably 
absorbs  20 percent  to 30 percent  of the budget, although  the exact size 
of the Soviet  defense establishment  at realistic  prices is probably  known 
by no one.23  A promising  approach  to reform,  therefore,  is to restructure 
the budget  to ensure macroeconomic  stability, to align relative prices 
with  social  priorities,  and  to make  room  for growth  in private  consump- 
tion. 
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Some Soviet economists have recommended  creating a two-level 
banking  system to help limit money growth as a means of controlling 
inflation.  Without  doubt,  creating  a market-oriented  banking  system will 
be a vital part  of a reformed  Soviet economy. But it seems certain  that 
there is today no way that monetary policy can operate to control 
spending independently  of fiscal policy. There are virtually no retail 
banks, no credit market  instruments,  and no variable-price  or variable- 
yield assets. The total value of equity-like "stocks" is around 0.02 
percent  of national  income. Mortgages  are  unheard  of. The chief house- 
hold nonmonetary financial assets are savings accounts and lottery 
bonds, both of which are virtually  perfect substitutes  for money. 
Because of the structure  of financial  markets,  most of the government 
deficit is effectively monetized. Even with a broader  menu of assets, it 
is difficult  to identify  components  of spending  that  are interest  sensitive. 
For example, without  hard  budget  constraints,  why would firms  tighten 
their  belts in response  to interest  or credit  signals?  For all these reasons, 
monetary  policy is not  an  independent  macroeconomic  policy instrument 
at this time. In the near  term,  therefore,  the task of controlling  excessive 
aggregate  demand  will fall largely  on fiscal  policy. 
In studying  the performance  of socialist economies, a Western ma- 
croeconomist  cannotfail  to notice  the  disastrous  side  effects of producers 
operating  in a sellers' market.  Until now, socialist enterprises  have had 
no fear  of depressions  or idled  capacity.  The symptoms  of high-pressure 
economies have been queues for any reasonably high-quality  good, 
sellers' rationing, deterioration  of product quality and variety, poor 
service, lack of labor  discipline,  and  low rates of innovation. 
The experience of Eastern Europe leads one to wonder whether 
Arthur  Okun  overestimated  the advantages  of a high-pressure  economy 
in promoting  many economic objectives when he wrote in 1973, "The 
greater diffusion of  opportunity and of  upward mobility in a full- 
utilization economy is a vital social benefit; and that benefit helps to 
explain  why the  pursuit  of full  employment  is an integral  part  of a  liberal's 
creed."  24 
The conventional  worry about Okun's emphasis on a high-pressure 
economy has been the dangers  of high  inflation.25  There  may in addition 
24. Okun  (1973,  pp. 246). 
25. See, for example, the discussion  of Okun's  position  by William  Fellner  and Alan 
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be subtler  macroeconomic  costs involving  lowered overall market  dis- 
cipline.  The  unhappy  lesson of Eastern  Europe  is that  super-full  employ- 
ment and chronic full utilization of capacity seem less effective than 
unemployment  and excess capacity in promoting  attention to quality 
and  variety  of product,  product  and  process innovation,  adjustments  to 
structural  change, and a general sense of market discipline among 
workers  and  managers. 
In sum, there will be no substitute  for governmental  budget disci- 
pline-reducing the budget deficit and perhaps mopping  up the ruble 
overhang-in reducing  the pandemic  and  growing  shortages  and excess 
demand  in the Soviet economy today. Although fiscal austerity may 
have unpopular  elements, it can be sweetened if the fiscal reforms 
involve  reducing  defense spending  and  uneconomic  subsidies.  However, 
the primary  attraction  of a tight fiscal policy will be to restore value to 
the currency  and to reduce inefficient  nonmonetary  rationing  devices 
like queues, coupon  rationing,  and  bribery. 
Overall Assessment 
At the end of the day, how likely are the Soviet reform efforts to 
succeed? Before voicing certain gloomy thoughts about the future of 
economic  reform,  I must  begin by applauding  the immeasurable  contri- 
bution that the Gorbachev  political  reforms  have made to freedom in 
socialist  countries  and  peace in the entire  world. Even if he were to step 
down  today,  he would  surely  stand  among  the  great  leaders  of the modern 
world. 
On the economic  front, however, the road has proven rockier. We 
should  place little confidence  in prognostications  about the economies 
of Eastern  Europe.  Nonetheless, it is hard  to have high  hopes for a rapid 
turnaround  in economic  growth  for the Soviet Union. 
To begin  with, economic reform  has been long on rhetoric  and short 
on substance. The small steps toward liberalization  since 1985 have 
mainly  increased  income growth  and have had little impact  on output. 
Shortages  have increased, rationing  is widespread,  and relative prices 
are probably  more distorted than they were in 1985. No  substantial 
successes have been achieved in removing the roadblocks to reform 
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have augmented  his executive powers, Soviet reformers  appear  deeply 
divided on the sequence of reforms, and no coherent reform  plan has 
emerged.  Both stabilization  policy and  price liberalization  seem further 
away today than  they have been since 1985. 
In  addition,  while  political  sentiments  are  difficult  to assess, the strong 
pro-market  sentiments found in many Eastern European countries- 
particularly  Poland  and Hungary-have not become widespread  in the 
Soviet Union. Recent polls put confidence  in the Communist  party  and 
the KGB above that in the State Commission  on Prices or the Ministry 
of Retail Trade. The growth  of political  democracy,  with its traditional 
antipathy  to taxes or increases  in the prices of basic necessities, augurs 
poorly  for reaching  a political  consensus in favor of a dramatic  increase 
in consumer  goods prices. Moreover,  in the face of continued  struggles 
among  nationalities,  political  energies  may be siphoned  off into keeping 
Lithuania,  Russia, and  other  republics  in line instead  of pushing  through 
unpopular  reforms. It may well be necessary to have a regime change 
and a repudiation  of communist  government  in the Soviet Union before 
the transition  to the market  can be completed. 
Most important,  as the economic experience of both the advanced 
industrial  countries  and the third  world amply  demonstrate,  successful 
reform  programs  leading to rapid  economic growth are the exception 
rather  than the rule. Latin America is littered with failed reform  pro- 
grams. Hungary,  which has more than two decades of reform  behind 
her, has yet to find a way out of the swamp of central planning. The 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe have undertaken  numerous re- 
forms over the past four decades, yet none has yet produced  a vibrant 
and rapidly  growing  economy. Perhaps  the Poles have discovered the 
magic  potion  in their 1990  experiment,  but  it surely  is off to a rocky start. 
Even those successful  reform  efforts  in East Asia have taken  many  years 
to bear  fruit. 
All this is not an argument  for halting  the process of economic  reform. 
Fitful  capitalism  may be preferred  to stagnant  socialism, and  the reform 
process must  start  somewhere.  I end  on an optimistic  note by concluding 
that  if the advocates  of the market  convince  a skeptical  public,  overcome 
their  conservative  protagonists,  design  their  reforms  wisely, choose the 
correct  sequence  of measures,  eliminate  the budget  deficit,  have  good  luck 
with  harvests,  survive  the  political  turmoil  of a disintegrating  empire,  and 
persist  for a decade-with  all  these, they have a ghost of a chance. Comments 
and Discussion 
Ed A. Hewett: There  is a lot to talk about  in this paper  and  a lot to talk 
about  in the reform.  I will focus on William  Nordhaus's  general  conclu- 
sion that  reform  should  happen  in stages. I used to believe in reforms  by 
stages, but not anymore. I have seen too many slow reforms fail to 
believe  in  them.  I offer  my comments  with  considerable  humility  because 
no one really  knows right  now how to create a market  economy, and in 
the Soviet Union special problems make it, in some ways, doubly 
difficult. 
The first point I would make is that Nordhaus overestimates the 
psychological  impediments  to the big bang, at least in the Soviet Union. 
To be sure, he makes a number  of statements  that reflect conventional 
wisdom  on the Soviet Union. Soviets don't understand  markets. Spec- 
ulation  is a four-letter  word. The "yen"-his  pun, not mine-for  the 
market  is confined to mathematical  economists. There is hostility to 
entrepreneurial  activity. 
Let us discuss each of these propositions,  first of all, the yen for the 
market  and  how low it is in the Soviet Union. On  January  1, 1988,  8,000 
cooperatives  in the Soviet Union  employed  88,000  people. Today, about 
4.5 million  people work in more than 200,000  cooperatives. In the last 
six months  of 1989,  a million  people  joined the rolls of coops, and about 
50,000 cooperatives were founded. Coops are thriving  although eco- 
nomic  policy toward  them is restrictive, and the social environment  is 
hostile and, in some cases, physically threatening  to cooperators. So I 
am not convinced that the yen for markets  is quite as constrained  as 
many people think it is, although  I admit that that still remains to be 
proven. 
Indeed,  "speculation"  is a four-letter  word  in the Soviet Union, even 
among  the mathematical  economists who yearn for economic reform. 
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They can talk  as eloquently  against  speculators  as they can  for economic 
reform.  On the other hand, I think  a good sales pitch-it  would have to 
be by Gorbachev-could make the point that the introduction  of a full- 
blooded  market  in the Soviet Union would reduce  the opportunities  for 
speculators,  not increase  them.  Those  who have visited  the Soviet Union 
know what I am talking  about. This immensely complex bureaucratic 
system  provides  innumerable  opportunities  to get hold  of scarce  supplies 
and sell them for exorbitant  prices. In a market  with free prices, those 
opportunities  would  disappear. 
Is there  hostility  toward  entrepreneurial  activity  in the Soviet Union? 
I suppose so, but  I think  many  people underestimate  the entrepreneurial 
capabilities  of Soviet managers  even now. Anyone who has spent some 
time  looking  at what  it is like  to operate  an enterprise  in the Soviet Union 
must come away with admiration  for what Soviet managers do in 
conditions that we could best understand  by thinking  about the worst 
days of World  War  II in the U.S. economy. These are people who, on a 
daily basis, do not know what inputs will show up, what their quality 
will be, how many workers they will have. And yet,  somehow the 
factories manage  to keep going. They can deal with input  uncertainties 
in a way that most Harvard  MBAs would find impossible. What they 
cannot  do, and  what they are  going  to have to learn  to do, is to deal with 
uncertainties  on the output  side, both in price and in finding  customers. 
I happen  to believe that  they have more capabilities  to learn  than many 
people think  they do. 
Finally, what of the proposition  that the Soviets don't understand 
markets?  I dare  say they don't. Not many  people do. In a referendum  in 
the United States on the question "Do you support  capitalism?"  surely 
98 percent would say yes. If, on the other hand, someone wrote down 
the way our system works  and  laid  out precisely all the consequences of 
it and  took a referendum,  I would  not want  to be fighting  for the plus side 
of that proposition because I suspect it might lose. I remember,  for 
example, during the 1973 oil shock in the United States, how many 
people in line at one gas station told a reporter  that they would rather 
wait in line than  have prices go up to their  equilibrium  level. 
In thinking  about  how to create markets-something no one knows a 
great  deal about-we  have emphasized  too much  the need  for a majority 
of the population to be ready to accept markets before they can be 
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the population  to accept a market  before the fact. After they have lived 
in a market  for a while, however, they might  learn  to love it. 
One point Nordhaus makes is quite legitimate and important:  the 
more  one thinks  about  creating  a market  economy the more one comes 
to understand  the complex  web of institutions,  of practices, and  of well- 
trained  people necessary  to make  a market  work. The underpinnings  do 
not exist in the Soviet Union. There is, for example, no commercial 
banking  system  in  the Soviet Union. The  people  who work  in  commercial 
banking  are really  tellers with green eyeshades who pass what they call 
money  back  and  forth. Similar  gaps exist throughout  the system. 
On  the other  hand,  although  I do not know  for sure  how one develops 
markets,  I am pretty sure one does not do it by simply  debating  laws in 
Moscow or sending people to school. Markets develop by throwing 
people  into  them.  The government  can then  offer schooling  to those who 
want to learn more. For Soviet enterprise  managers-these  people in 
whom  I have more  faith  than  Nordhaus  does-you  have to hit them  over 
the head and get their attention, and then let them start  learning  about 
how to operate  in a market. 
I also think Nordhaus underestimates  the cost of going slow. One 
point that he makes is that the big bang could bring a collapse in the 
Soviet economy. I suppose it might, but unless something happens 
quickly,  the economy is going  to collapse anyway. 
Since the middle of last year, industrial  output has started to slow 
down  at an  accelerating  pace. Even official  statistics  for  industrial  output 
the first  three months of this year show about a 1 percent decline, and 
those statistics probably  have a 5-6 percent hidden inflation  built into 
them. Every month, economic activity is falling, and at an increasing 
rate.  Other  indicators  suggest  that now shortages  are feeding  upon each 
other. 
The shortages are particularly  dangerous in a hyper-monopolized 
system.  Approximately  one-third  of important  industrial  products  in the 
Soviet Union are produced by only one enterprise. If that enterprise 
sneezes, the economy catches cold. To give  just one example, only one 
enterprise  in the Soviet Union produces electric locomotives. It pro- 
duced only 75 percent of its goal in 1989. Why? Because only one 
enterprise  produces  the engine  for  the locomotives, and  it produced  only 
75 percent  of its goal. Why? Because it could not get parts  because the 
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That is the situation  they are in now. I was in Moscow last month. I 
can tell you that many  people in the government  now are near  a state of 
panic over the economy, which, from my point of view, is precisely 
where they should  be. 
If Murphy's  Law of Reforms  is that  anything  you do will make  things 
worse, I would offer one amendment:  if you do nothing,  things will be 
worse yet. But I would also make  the more  general  observation  that the 
past five years of Soviet reform  offer living proof that partial  reforms 
make  things  worse. We knew that  already,  which is why I am interested 
in a big bang  and  not in going slow. 
The final  point I would make about going slow is that slow reforms 
will probably never get anywhere, a point Nordhaus touches on in 
passing. For example, if you keep the 30-odd  branch  ministries  that are 
now de facto the owners of enterprises  in the Soviet Union, they will, 
on the first  day of a reform,  gut any reform  measures  that  they are asked 
to implement. 
For example, we all agree that a reform  that works well is going to 
involve privatization-rather quick  privatization.  Who is going to man- 
age the privatization?  In the Soviet Union the temptation  is going to be 
to let the ministries  do it, that is, let the ministries  divest themselves of 
their own enterprises.  If you believe that they will do that, I have got a 
bridge  to sell you. Soviet ministries  have proven  many  times, over many 
years, that they are adept at renaming  what they are doing in order to 
make Soviet leaders  happy,  while doing  just the contrary  of what Soviet 
leaders  want them  to do. 
Another  problem  with partial  reforms  is that it is necessary to begin 
by giving  subsidies  to enterprises,  with  a schedule  for  how  those subsidies 
will decline over time. Because of the budget-balance  problem,  it will be 
necessary  to cut subsidies  the first  day, and  then  to reduce  them  quickly. 
Winners  and  losers must  be chosen  ahead  of time,  requiring  a tremendous 
amount  of information  about which enterprises  will survive the earth- 
quake  in the price system. 
But if it is possible to predict winners and losers at that point, an 
economic reform is unnecessary. One can simply go ahead and run 
enterprises  directly from Moscow. The fact of the matter is that it is 
impossible  to specify  the subsidy  schedule  with  confidence.  Enterprises, 
knowing  the subsidy schedule is a best guess, will support  the reform, 
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for exceptions, enterprises  will usually win. The likely outcome within 
a few years  is that  subsidies  are no lower than  they were before  because 
every enterprise  is an exception to the reform. 
Clearly, a quick reform  will require  doing many things at the same 
time. Nordhaus's  table 4 is an excellent list of what needs to be done, 
one of the best I have encountered. 
Because it will not be possible to do everything  in table 4, it will be 
necessary  to set priorities.  I would put several items on my top priority 
list. At the beginning,  prices should be revised and then freed up as 
quickly as possible. This should be done in an environment  of tight 
money, where measures have been taken to  reduce the monetary 
overhang.  There  are several  ways to do that, and  Nordhaus  goes through 
them. 
A simple  but  effective commercial  banking  system should  be in place. 
Nordhaus is quite right in pointing out that Soviet economists are 
infatuated  with rather sophisticated financial  instruments  and institu- 
tions, and they are not paying  enough  attention  to the need for a simple 
banking  system. 
Government  policy should  be fiercely  pro-competitive,  which means 
not only breaking  up the large enterprises  and privatizing  them but, at 
the same  time, encouraging  entry  for new enterprises.  For this to work, 
the ministries  must be destroyed. I mean that literally. They must be 
gotten  out of Moscow and out of the way. 
What  will probably  happen  and  what  I hope will happen  is that, as the 
first act of a reform, all state enterprises will be turned over to new 
bodies, semi-independent  of the government, whose job it will be to 
convert  them into  joint stock companies. The ministries  will, from day 
one, find  that  they are out of business. 
This must be as open an economy as possible, although here the 
Soviet  Union  is much  different  than  Eastern  Europe.  It is quite  possible, 
in  an economy  of this size, to increase  competition  dramatically  without 
opening  the borders  to foreign competition, simply by unleashing  the 
defense plants and allowing them to compete in the civilian economy 
under  the cover of a devalued exchange rate and a fairly high set of 
tariffs. 
I would add one thing to Nordhaus's table 4. At the beginning  the 
Soviets need to get a statistical system in place that tells them where 
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they now use is of very uneven quality, but in particular  the aggregate 
statistics are useless. The CIA has done the best it can, and, in fact, if 
some CIA people were put in Goskomstat  (the State Statistics Commit- 
tee), the Soviets would be better off than they are now. Anything is 
possible nowadays. 
I agree with Nordhaus that a full-bodied  complex market  will take 
years to create in the Soviet Union. That does not mean that a fairly 
simple, rudimentary  market  cannot  be up and  operating  quickly, say, by 
the end of 1991,  if Soviet leaders  work at it. One objection  to going this 
route  is that  there  will be strikes  and social unrest,  which is undoubtedly 
true. However, if the government  does not do anything  this year, there 
are going to be strikes and social tensions and unrest, but they will be 
worse. 
They will  be worse, in  part,  because  the perception  is now widespread 
in the Soviet Union that the government  has absolutely no idea what it 
is  doing, which happens to be true. Strikes that come because of 
government  confusion will be a sign of hopelessness, of a lack of any 
faith in the future. Strikes  and protests that come because the reforms 
are beginning  to take hold  will be a sign of some hope. 
I would also point out that the reform  need not be as painful  in the 
Soviet Union as it is in Poland.  This is still a country  where the net debt 
is relatively low. It is a country with a gold stock somewhere in the 
neighborhood  of $35  billion.  It has assets and  could  use them  intelligently 
if it would  get an intelligent  reform  under  way. 
Let me conclude by talking  about what could happen. The cause of 
radical  reform  has gone on a roller coaster since last summer.  Leonid 
Abalkin had a fairly radical  proposal, as Nordhaus points out. Prime 
Minister  Nikolai  Ryzhkov  seemed  to torpedo  that  proposal  in  December, 
but, at the same time, Gorbachev  did something  very interesting. He 
appointed  his first-ever  adviser  on economics, Nikolai Petrakov,  a man 
whose devotion to markets  would make Milton Friedman  blush some 
days. Since January,  Petrakov  has spent somewhere between one and 
ten hours a day talking to Gorbachev about economics and putting 
together  an economic  program  that  is going  to be coming  out in the next 
few months. 
A struggle  is going on now that will last for the rest of the year. One 
set of decrees and laws is now on track in a process that involves 
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Commission.  A somewhat  separate,  and  more  radical,  operation  is going 
on between Gorbachev  and Petrakov. In addition, Stanislav Shatalin, 
who is a soulmate  to Petrakov  in his commitment  to markets,  has  joined 
the presidential  commission. 
It looks like  what  Petrakov  is going  to sign  on to-I  think  with support 
from  Abalkin-is  something  like a big  bang.  We will be hearing,  over the 
next few months,  much  more  talk of a Polish-type  solution. 
What  has  happened  in  Poland  so far  has  made  a tremendous  impression 
on Soviet economists, a positive impression  for the most part. At least 
two things are critical to the next few months to give a Polish-type 
solution a chance to work. One is a new government. Most of the 
government  now in power in the Soviet Union needs to go. Unlike 
Poland,  the current  government  has absolutely  no popular  support,  and 
it would  be very difficult  to introduce  a reform  of the sort  they are  talking 
about  without  that  popular  support.  A new government  with many new 
faces will be critical  to the success of a reform.  Second, there must  be a 
much more permissive policy than so far on republican autonomy, 
transforming  it from a threat to an opportunity. I do not think this 
outcome  is excluded,  as tense as the situation  may  appear  at the moment, 
particularly  with Lithuania. 
Even in the best of circumstances,  if a radical  reform  is announced 
and  implemented  sometime  in 1991,  economic  performance  in the Soviet 
Union  will continue  to deteriorate  this year  and  next year  because of the 
inertia  built  into this system. What  we are arguing  about  now is the end 
of 1991  on: 1992  and 1993.  I think  at least some of the Soviet economists 
are  realistic  enough  to understand  this. 
General Discussion 
Janos Kornai asserted that political roadblocks are the primary 
obstacle to reform in the Soviet Union. He observed that the main 
difference  between the Soviet Union and Eastern  Europe  is the political 
environment.  Eastern Europe is on the way to genuine multiparty 
systems with populations  and governments  committed  to abandoning 
socialism.  The Soviet government  appears  committed  to revitalization 
rather  than abandonment.  To Kornai, the difficulty stems from the 
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reason, whatever influence one or the other economic adviser might 
have on Gorbachev is less important  than Ed Hewett suggested. In 
Kornai's view, the resistance to a market  economy is so widespread 
throughout  the party apparatus  that even a leadership  unambiguously 
committed  to free markets  would  find  them  nearly  impossible  to achieve. 
While  agreeing  that Gorbachev  faces great  political  difficulties,  Hewett 
noted that the party  itself is losing power, both from  local elections and 
from  attacks  by Gorbachev  himself. 
Hendrik  Houthakker  contrasted  the Soviet Union, where  attempts  at 
economic reform  have been directed  largely  from  the center, with China 
during the 1980s, where successful reforms were often regional and 
involved relinquishing  central  authority  to local agents. In particular  he 
cited the agricultural  reforms  in Szechwan province and the opening  of 
Canton to foreign investment.  The Soviets, by contrast, have resisted 
attempts such as Lithuania's  to become a more open and independent 
economy. Houthakker  asserted that the Soviet population's  inexperi- 
ence with markets is less of an obstacle to reform than frequently 
claimed, noting  that many individuals  in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe  have experience  in unofficial  or underground  economies, some 
with cooperatives. Nordhaus  accepted China as a counterexample  to 
the proposition  that  no socialist  country  has had a successful reform  but 
questioned  its relevance,  noting  that  the agricultural  reforms  were a one- 
time catch-up from levels of productivity  far below those of Eastern 
Europe. 
Some panelists discussed the role of privatization.  William Poole 
found it crucial  both to promote  efficiency and to reduce the monetary 
overhang  through  the selling  of assets, and  emphasized  that  it should  be 
at the top of the list of reforms.  Peter Kenen noted that, while privati- 
zation in the West has mostly involved  the sale of profitable  enterprises, 
the Abalkin  report  advocates the sale of failed enterprises.  He doubted 
that  much  overhang  could be absorbed  by selling such assets. 
Kenen stressed the importance  of opening  the Soviet economy to the 
rest of the world. Freer trade would allow imported  goods to smooth 
over glitches  in the reform  process and  provide  competition.  Even more 
important,  an open economy would  import  a set of internally  consistent 
market  prices to the Soviet economy. William D.  Nordhaus  317 
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